Why universities and scientific world should stay away from the tobacco industry. Journey in Big Tobacco deception by Zagà, Vincenzo et al.
9VOL. 67 • No. 1/2018
Pneumologia
REVISTA SOCIETĂŢII ROMÂNE DE PNEUMOLOGIE
EDITORIAL
Why universities and scientific 
world should stay away  
from the tobacco industry.  
Journey in Big Tobacco deception
De ce universitățile și lumea științifică ar trebui să stea deoparte  
de industria tutunului. Incursiune în Marea Decepție a Tutunului
Vincenzo Zagà1,  
M. Sofia Cattaruzza2, 
Francisco Rodriguez 
Lozano3,  
Antigona Trofor4,  
Marco Mura5, 
Giacomo 
Mangiaracina6,  
Biagio Tinghino7
1. President of Italian Society 
of Tobaccology (SITAB)
2. Dipartimento di Sanità 
Pubblica e Malattie infettive, 
“Sapienza” Università degli 
Studi di Roma
3. President of ENSP
4. Department of Pneumology, 
“Grigore T. Popa” University of 
Medicine and Pharmacy, Iași, 
Romania
5. Division of Respirology, 
Western University, London, 
Canada
6. Direttore Responsabile di 
Tabaccologia
7. Dirigente Responsabile UOS 
Alcologia e Nuove Dipendenze 
Dipartimento di Salute 
Mentale e delle Dipendenze 
ASST di Vimercate (MB)
Corresponding author:  
Vincenzo Zagà, Pulmonologist MD 
E-mail: presidenza@tabaccologia.it 
Via Dagnini 19, 40137 Bologna, Italia
University scientific research should never accept funding from companies operating in the same sector in which it is applied, due 
to evident conflicts of interest that could influ-
ence or undermine the results of the research 
itself. This applies even more to industries whose 
production methods or products, such as tobacco, 
damage human health(1). 
Universities that turn a blind eye to this mar-
ket, accepting the advantages offered by grants 
and donations, become accomplices in spreading 
the “tobacco epidemic”(2), because the funding 
comes directly from the sale of tobacco products! 
This is “dirty” money, causes illness, suffering 
and death(3).
Researchers who accept such funding risk wel-
coming the “Trojan horse” of the tobacco indus-
try, and should remember Virgil in the Aeneid 
(Virgil, Eneide, lib. II, v. 49): “I fear the Greeks 
when they bring gifts” (lat.: “Timeo Danaos et dona 
ferentes”). It is the unheard cry with which the 
poor Laocoon tries in vain to convince the Trojans 
not to welcome the fatal horse within the walls. 
The ending is known.
University scientific research, due to the link 
that binds it to the younger generations who are 
educated, has an even greater duty not to cooper-
ate with the tobacco industry, taking into account 
the commercial policies that enlist young people 
and transform them, through dependence, into 
“loyal customers” for many years(4).
In no way should the academic world endorse 
the frantic search to whitewash the tobacco 
giants, which has never succeeded, but has been 
recently revived with the introduction of the 
“reduced risk ” products, the so-called “cold 
smoke”. The tobacco industry is a wolf in sheep’s 
clothing trying to re-present itself, from death 
factory to health company(5), even to the extent 
of changing its name: goodbye Philip Morris and 
welcome to Altria Group Inc.(6)! Today is Mondelēz 
International.
The social responsibility of the 
universities
By their “raison d’être”, universities are insti-
tutions dedicated to improving life through the 
research and dissemination of knowledge. The 
university context facilitates “peer to peer” com-
munication among young people and the acquisi-
tion of knowledge and skills that lead to action 
to improve their health, and that of the commu-
nity, and the propagation of healthy lifestyles 
through the emulation of behavior.
Universities are invested with an important 
ethical responsibility to help the world reduce and 
eliminate the tobacco epidemic, via research, 
training and information. For this reason they 
must be protected, with stringent regulations, 
from any maneuver that could undermine the 
indispensable freedoms for the pursuit of scien-
tific truth, even at the cost of giving up rich fund-
ing that could accelerate the pursuit of its 
scientific objectives. Otherwise, universities 
might lose all credibility by throwing years of 
tradition and rigorous research into the air.
The need to protect academic moral authority 
requires universities to renounce all forms of 
cooperation with the tobacco industry(7).
The nature of the problem
Although tobacco has been used in the West 
for at least 500 years, the damage to human 
health began in the late 1800s when, thanks to 
the mechanized production of cigarettes with 
what would become known as the “Bonsack 
machine”, cigarette manufacturing passed from 
a cottage industry to huge industrial mass pro-
duction. This has allowed it to flood the planet 
with cigarettes arriving today at what the World 
Health Organization (WHO) calls the Tobacco 
Epidemic. The tobacco epidemic has inexorably 
led the planet to the so-called “Golden Holocaust”, 
due to the 7 million smoking-related deaths 
which occur each year(8,9).
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Despite the fact that nowadays there are numerous 
and established proofs of causality between tobacco 
smoke and smoking-related diseases, more than a billion 
people in the world continue to smoke. The prevalence 
and incidence of smoking have increased every time 
that, over the past 150 years, there have been contro-
versies among researchers on the real causality between 
tobacco consumption and related diseases. For over half 
a century, the tobacco industry has used these contro-
versies by promoting the strategy of doubt(5,10).
Today, however, thanks to tobacco control policies 
implemented in Western countries, the tobacco industry 
has a desperate need to involve universities in the decep-
tion of non-causality between tobacco smoke and smok-
ing-related diseases(11,12).
The behavior of the tobacco industry
The contemporary tobacco industry was born practi-
cally in 1882 thanks to the encounter between the com-
mercial genius of James Buchanan Duke with the 
mechanic Bonsack, inventor of the machine which pro-
duced a kind of infinitely long cigarette that was divided 
into the right size using mechanical cuts. Accompanying 
the mechanized production of cigarettes with effective 
marketing action, Buchanan Duke invented the tobacco 
industry and became, unwittingly, responsible for one 
of the worst massacres the world has ever known.
This interpretation, mostly promoted by the tobacco 
industry, was acceptable until the end of the 1940s, but since 
then the dangerous properties of tobacco products have been 
identified and well studied, and the tobacco industry has 
become increasingly irresponsible and criminal(8).
Big Tobacco – the term used to identify the largest 
companies in the global tobacco industry – has proven 
to be totally indifferent to the pain and suffering inflict-
ed on humanity by its products, and has adopted a busi-
ness model that puts the exponential growth of profit 
before the value of consumers’ lives.
Since the scientific community established that tobacco 
use is causally associated with premature death and pre-
ventable chronic diseases, the tobacco industry has faced 
the threat to its profits by resorting to deception and lies(13) 
instead of investing to make its products less dangerous. 
Only recently, under the pressure of a more widespread 
societal sensitivity of the damage to public health arising 
from tobacco products, the industry has entered the “harm 
reduction” perspective, developing less toxic products 
(e-cigarettes, IQOS or “cold smoke”), of which, however, 
little is known, in particular about their long-term effects.
These products make sense as a substitute for traditional 
cigarettes for smokers who do not want or cannot quit, but 
they pose a great danger to non-smokers because, being 
advertised as less harmful, they can also lure non-smokers 
closer to tobacco. Paradoxically, these less toxic products 
could lead to greater tobacco damage to public health.
Once again, the tobacco industry casts doubt on the 
consequences of tobacco smoke, proved by the scientific 
research, and try to buy time in order to acquire new 
market shares.
The new products deriving from the industrial strat-
egies of so-called “harm reduction” could have a similar 
role to what Bonsack’s machine had at the end of the 
nineteenth century: to increase the consumption of 
tobacco.
Returning to the relationship between this industry 
and research, it must never be forgotten that the 
response strategy of Big Tobacco was to launch a massive 
and systematic attack to subvert the veracity of acquired 
scientific knowledge(14,15), to misinform public opinion 
and decision makers, and to delay any form of control 
over the manufacture and use of its products. The 
famous “Frank Statement” is an excellent example of 
how the industry made the public believe that it was 
interested in the damage to health caused by tobacco, 
when instead its intentions were only to legally protect 
itself and cover up the truth for as long as possible in 
order to continue selling and making profits(15,16).
This attack on scientific knowledge, often labeled as 
“ junk science” depending on the circumstances, still 
continues today, in subtle or blatantly clear forms, 
depending on the national contexts in which it 
operates.
The omnipresent benefit of the doubt on diseases 
caused by tobacco, sown by tobacco multinational cor-
porations, is a scam designed specifically to prevent the 
translation of knowledge into health policies which can 
lead to reduced consumption and profits. The strategy 
of Big Tobacco has always been to generate doubt in the 
minds of judges, juries and public opinion, which lack 
the technical-scientific background necessary to criti-
cally analyze the causal relationship between smoking 
and health-related harm. As shown in some confidential 
documents such as “We are the factory of doubt...”, creat-
ing what is called agnotology, or the study of “construct-
ed” ignorance. This strategy has been used to paralyze 
the efforts of the scientific community to better under-
stand the natural history of diseases associated with 
tobacco consumption.
In implementing this strategy, the tobacco industry 
has started parallel research, appropriately manipu-
lated, hiring and bribing various researchers all over the 
world, with the explicit intention to insinuate doubt and 
to contain the sense of resentment of public opinion 
towards the tobacco sector. The industry has always 
acted with indifference and insensitivity to the suffer-
ing caused and with the aim of postponing any social 
control that could in any way affect its unscrupulous 
commercial strategies(11,16).
For over six decades, the tobacco “cartel” has tried 
in every way to actively challenge the scientific evidence 
in the media and courtrooms which has proved it to be 
responsible: a strategy that has, with some success, dis-
guised its deception and diverted the attention and judg-
ment of public opinion and political authorities(11,12).
For these actions of sabotage of scientific research, 
the tobacco industry has also resorted to the corruption 
of leading figures in the medical-scientific field, such as 
Ragnar Raylander in Switzerland (Professor of the 
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University of Geneva, paid to produce research aimed at 
denying the harmful effects of tobacco smoke, con-
demned in 2003 by the Court of Justice of Geneva, for 
“unprecedented scientific fraud in the field of passive 
smoking”), Gaston Vettorazzi in USA (ex-toxicologist of 
the WHO, hired to hinder the entry in force of regula-
tions to protect human health that would have limited 
the use of dangerous pesticides in the cultivation of 
tobacco) and Giuseppe Lojacono in Italy (former 
Professor of Health Economics at University of Perugia, 
Director of the Epidemiology & Prevention Magazine 
and of the Scientific Society with the same name; he was 
the “secret anti-IARC [International Agency for Research 
on Cancer] informant” paid to discredit the results of a 
major study on passive smoking and incriminate, 
instead, pollution as a cause of lung cancer)(17-21).
Likewise, the tobacco industry has bribed politicians 
and journalists to misrepresent research results when-
ever they were perceived as threatening to their profits. 
Even today, Big Tobacco acquires indulgence and influ-
ence through electoral contributions to politicians, spon-
sorship of sporting and cultural events, financial support 
for charitable community initiatives, philanthropic insti-
tutions (such as the Red Cross, the Movement of Italian 
Parents – Moige), up to the promotion, through associ-
ated holding companies, of scientific conferences on 
issues of pollution, ecology and environment, relegating 
the tobacco problem to an ancillary role(17, 22-25).
The industry has even created opinion groups to 
sabotage WHO actions for tobacco control and to mis-
represent the reports on the harmfulness of passive 
smoking(26),  inc luding the conclusions of the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) on 
the causal relationship between passive smoking and 
lung cancer.
As if this were not enough, it has put pressure on the 
pharmaceutical companies that promoted campaigns 
and therapies for smoking cessation and has threatened 
airlines against the adoption of smoke restrictions on 
board aircraft(27).
All these practices are those of a corrupt industry 
that are obviously incompatible with any kind of col-
laboration with health institutions in general and aca-
demics in particular(28). Rather, they have the task of 
transmitting to future health professionals the ability 
to treat and prevent smoking(29) and should have a policy 
statement that specifically prohibits academic bodies 
from accepting tobacco industry funding including grant 
funding.
In the USA there are already several examples of this 
practice, and it is to be hoped that this will soon spread 
all over the world. Indeed, the European Journal of Public 
Health will no longer publish tobacco industry-support-
ed research, a practice already adopted by many other 
medical journals such as BMJ, Heart, Thorax, PLOS One 
and many others(30).   n
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